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Introduction
China’s post-socialist urban transformation is unprecedented. In 1978,China had 158 cities, an urbanisation level of 17.9%, and a total of172 million people living in urban areas. By 2012, these figures had
risen to 658, 52.6%, and 712 million respectively. Within 35 years, China’s
urbanisation surpassed the 50% benchmark, indicating the addition of
around 540 million people to its urban population. (1) In 2012, the total num-
ber of the floating population reached 236 million, meaning that rural mi-
grants who did not have an urban household registration (hukou) were the
primary source of the urban population increase. 
Millions of rural migrants who were granted geographic mobility for travel
and work but denied socioeconomic entitlements provided by work units
(danwei), compounds, and subsidised housing in host cities, were forced to
seek accommodations on their own. (2) This severe transformation created
migrant enclaves known as chengzhongcun (城中村), literally villages amidst
the city or urban villages, within booming Chinese cities.
Ma and Xiang first identified peasant enclaves as a “new urban mosaic
that did not exist in Maoist China” and correlated their formation with the
resurgence of kinship and its social networks. (3) Subsequent studies have
recognised the function of urban villages in enabling rural migrants to reside,
work, and survive in cities during a period of rapid urban transformation. (4)
However, urban studies have tended to emphasise how urban villages en-
counter planning regimes in negotiating property rights, effective land use,
and spatial regularity. (5) Sociological analyses have aimed to examine the
changes in social exclusion, income inequality, and the urban fringe along
the global chain of production, (6) and anthropological accounts have at-
tempted to reveal the communal networks and power relations in specific
enclaves or among particular migrant groups. (7)
Building on this body of literature, the historical institutional perspective
featured here aims to explain the dynamics by which China has managed
and regulated the spatial contestation of rural migrants. This approach em-
bodies a historical orientation to study changes and attends to the ways in
which institutions contingently shape behaviours. It applies process tracing
to reveal the interplay between socialist land system and grassroots agency
in the making of governed migrant enclaves. The hukou system, another so-
cialist institution, is well documented as a source of social control and spa-
tial regularity in China’s cities. (8) While this paper uses the arrangements in
the factory dormitory to illustrate a similar pattern of spatial division, it
mainly concerns the role of intermediate agencies in regulating urban vil-
lages. The regulated space is considered a product of embeddedness and
uncertainty, in which the influences of socialist institutions are as important
as market forces.
This paper begins by examining how the factory dormitory and urban vil-
lage have become the major forms of migrant accommodation in Shenzhen.
It discusses how a socialist legacy has reproduced factory dormitories,
thereby creating a buffer zone to host and regulate new migrants who were
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Managing Migrant Contestation
Land appropriation, intermediate agency, and regulated space in Shenzhen
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ABSTRACT: This study considers the conditions under which China’s massive internal migration and urbanisation have resulted in re-
latively governed, less contentious, and yet fragile migrant enclaves. Shenzhen, the hub for rural-urban migration and a pioneer of
market reform, is chosen to illustrate the dynamics of spatial contestation in China’s sunbelt. This paper first correlates the socialist
land appropriation mechanisms to the making of the factory dormitory and urban village as dominant forms of migrant accommodation.
It then explains how and why overt contention has been managed by certain intermediate agencies in the urban villages that have not
only provided public goods but also regulated social order. It ends with an evaluation of the fragility of urban villages, which tend to
facilitate urban redevelopment at the expense of migrants’ living space. The interplay between socialist institutions and market forces
has thus ensured that migrant enclaves are regulated and integrated into the formal city.
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often financially unprepared for residing in the city. It also explains how the
collective land ownership system has created affordable housing in urban
villages to accommodate migrant entrepreneurs and workers. It then reveals
the role of joint-stock companies in migrant enclaves. Serving as local
bosses, these companies provided public goods, regulated social order, and
aligned with municipal authorities. These intermediate agencies not only
prevented China’s urban villages from developing into slums and the urban
decay and social disorder associated with them, but also reduced the num-
ber of recognised stakeholders and reduced organised resistance during
urban redevelopment.
Despite the absence of open contention, one should not overlook the dy-
namics introduced by rural migrants’ continuous inhabitation and daily ex-
changes in cities. Nor should this be interpreted as the migrants’ approval
or acceptance of the social and spatial settings. However, this paper mainly
concerns how and why socialist institutions and market forces work to-
gether to regulate these migrant enclaves. We argue that because of the
mediation by these intermediate agencies between the state and grassroots
society, China’s migrant enclaves demonstrate unique patterns and charac-
teristics compared with those in other developing countries, but also share
similarities with the rest of the urban population and the formal city. (9)
Sites and methods
Shenzhen is a hub for rural-urban migration and the pioneer of market re-
forms. Between 1979 and 2012, Shenzhen maintained an average annual
GDP growth rate of 24.8% and emerged from a county of 314,000 people
to become a metropolis with a permanent population (changzhu renkou)
of more than 10 million, of which three quarters were floating population
(liudong renkou), i.e., mainly rural migrants. (10) We therefore chose it as a
case study to exhibit the typical spatial contestations in China’s sunbelt. 
Until 2010, Shenzhen maintained a dual administrative structure that di-
vided the municipality into two divisions. One administration governed the
districts of Luohu, Futian, Nanshan, Yantian, and several early industrial zones
designated as the city centre (guannei 关内). The territorial jurisdiction of
the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) was restricted to this 395 km2 of land and
included 91 administrative villages. The other administration governed the
districts of Bao’an and Longgang and the new high-tech zones in the sub-
urbs. This area included 239 administrative villages spread across 1,553 km2
of land at the outskirts (guanwai 关外). (11) Map 1 illustrates the boundary
of the administrative divisions. Nearly all of the factory dormitories were
located in the spacious outskirts, whereas urban villages were found in both
divisions.
Our fieldwork was conducted between March 2012 and September 2013,
involving interviews, participant observation, and documentary research.
The findings were primarily drawn from observations made in two urban
villages in the city centre, with one urban village on the outskirts serving as
a control. These villages were selected to depict a representative trajectory
of spatial contestations in China’s sunbelt. Each of the villages has been
governed by a joint-stock company that was privatised from a village col-
lective. All of them have transformed into heterogeneous communities over
the course of rural-urban migration and urban sprawl, illustrating dynamic
contestations between the native villagers and different groups of rural mi-
grants. They are also large villages of comparable size whose demands for
public goods are immediate and huge. The primary differences between
them are that the two villages in the city centre are much wealthier than
the village in the outskirts, and that they are located in three different dis-
tricts. This controlled study allows us to assess the influences of demo-
graphic, economic, and institutional factors.
These sites were also chosen because of personal connections with the
inhabitants. Through our initial contacts, we were introduced to several local
bosses, clan leaders, and migrant workers who extended our reach in the
urban villages. This paper draws on 23 semi-structured interviews with the
heads or deputies of joint-stock companies, city planning officials, company
executives, NGOs staff, and native villagers. Numerous conversations were
also conducted with rural migrants who are shopkeepers, security guards,
or ordinary tenants. These informal contacts enriched our ethnographic ac-
counts and served to verify the data collected by other means.
Migrant accommodation in contested space
Shenzhen’s spatial contestation has been accelerated by extensive rural-
urban migration and continuous fiscal decentralisation. Shenzhen has expe-
rienced two phases of rural-urban migration, corresponding to different
contestation dynamics. The municipality maintained an average urban pop-
ulation growth rate of 15.8% in the 1980s, and that rose to 24% in the first
half of the 1990s. (12) In the first period, it primarily absorbed intra-provincial
migrants, including some rusticated youth holding an urban hukou. In the
second period, it led other cities in experiencing massive inter-provincial mi-
gration. (13) Intra-provincial migrants have found it easier to reside with friends
or relatives and less costly to return to the countryside once the urban job
market becomes saturated or unstable. In contrast, inter-provincial migrants
have had a genuine need to find self-help accommodation in host cities.
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Map 1 – Administrative divisions of Shenzhen, 1978-2010
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Many first-generation migrants did not build homes in the cities due to
their communal ties and ultimate goals: working away for them was prima-
rily a means to improve their families’ living standard and status in their
native villages. Cheap and substandard housing thus allowed these rural mi-
grants to minimise their living costs in cities and maximise their remittance
to their rural families and permanent residences. However, the second-gen-
eration migrants have higher individualistic expectations and have adapted
to modern lifestyles that can only be fulfilled in the cities. Survey data
showed that nearly 80% of young migrants intend to reside in big cities
permanently, developing their careers and raising their families. This behav-
ioural change has created enormous pressures in terms of housing, medical
care, child education, and communal services in the cities. (14)
The fiscal reform in 1994 further intensified the spatial contestation. The
reform replaced the revenue-sharing system with a tax-sharing system
under which customs, sales, and the majority of value-added taxes were
exclusively central, while taxes on business, stamps, property, and land use
were exclusively local. This reform has improved the central government’s
extractive capacity in relation to the local governments. Booming cities such
as Shenzhen were motivated to explore locally generated revenue to main-
tain public investments and cover social security expenses. It is estimated
that land-related revenue accounted for 72% of the total revenue of Guang-
dong Province after 1995. (15)
This backdrop implies that Shenzhen’s urban contestation is probably one
of the most severe in the country. When rapid urbanisation and rural-urban
migration encounter a fiscally weak and administratively shrunken state,
social decay and ungoverned enclaves tend to result. (16)Yet the pattern and
nature of Shenzhen’s migrant accommodations illustrate certain deviations.
Table 1 shows the types and features of migrant accommodation in
Guangdong Province over the last decade. (17) The overall pattern for mi-
grants’ choice of accommodation clustered consistently around affordable
and temporary housing. The major types of migrant accommodation were
dormitory and rental housing, which on average accounted for 84% of ac-
commodations. Rental housing gradually replaced dormitories as the most
favoured migrant accommodation. In Shenzhen, manufacturing workers em-
ployed in large enterprises often lived in the dormitories provided by their
employers, all of which were adjacent to the factories. Construction workers
and domestic workers were respectively accommodated in temporary com-
pounds built onsite and in their employers’ private households, both of
which were functionally another form of dormitory. Other rural migrants
who owned or worked in small and medium enterprises or service industries
tended to seek private accommodations on their own. According to an an-
nual report from Shenzhen’s Urban Villages Redevelopment Office, urban
village housing accounted for around 92% of the rental housing for rural
migrants. (18)
The majority of migrant accommodations were temporary housing. Over
the last decade, less than 5% of rural migrants purchased houses in cities.
Renting urban village apartments or residing in factory dormitories required
less capital and provided more flexibility, a rational choice given the mi-
grants’ low income-earning capacity in the cities and back-and-forth mi-
gration pattern. The fact that the hukou system denies rural migrants
socioeconomic entitlements such as subsidised public housing and the abil-
ity to obtain a mortgage within their host cities was the institutional factor
that forced the migrants to remain perpetually floating.
However, even if rural migrants – as second-class citizens and transients
– had a genuine interest in looking for affordable housing or were trapped
in temporary housing, these two factors do not explain how and why valu-
able land under urban sprawl was used to construct dormitories and apart-
ments for the most disadvantaged.  
Factory dormitories and the reproduction of
controlled space 
Although the quantity of migrant settlements varies between Shenzhen’s
administrative zones, these zones were constituted under the same collec-
tive land system. This is because although the Chinese state nominally owns
all of the land, the municipal governments in urban areas and the village
collectives in rural areas control the leasing, transfer, and appropriation of
land within their jurisdictions. A series of negotiations between two groups
of “socialist land masters” who were entitled to various land use rights have
thus overshadowed Shenzhen’s spatial contestations. (19)
The first group was the extension of the broad functional system (xitong
系统) of the Chinese government. Each of the ministries or commissions in
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Accommodation/Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Dormitory 44.8 47.8 43.8 39.1 37.7 34.0 32.9 33.6 27.8 29.8 27.2 24.4
Construction site 10.8 8.8 6.7 6.1 5.7 4.9 4.8 4.6 3.5 3.5 3.3 2.6
Rental house 30.9 34.8 42.1 45.3 47.3 52.0 52.8 52.2 58.4 57.1 59.5 63.2
Hotel or hostel 5.9 2.6 1.7 1.5 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.4 0.9
Local resident’s house 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.9 4.0 3.3 3.4 3.6 4.1 3.8 4.0 4.0
Others incl. own apartment 4.2 2.7 3.2 3.9 3.4 4.0 4.4 4.3 4.7 4.5 4.6 4.9
Table 1 – Types of migrant accommodation in Guangdong, 2001-2012 (%)
Source: Compiled using data from Ministry of Public Security, Collection of Statistical Materials on Temporary Population in China, Beijing, Qunzhong Press, 2001-2012.
the State Council and bureaus of the Communist Party has hierarchical units
at each territorial level of government. These units include government
agencies and state-owned enterprises, which are assigned specific ranks and
jurisdictions. Power is therefore fragmented between different xitongs and
municipal governments, creating tension but also collaboration on issues
of vital interest such as the competition for urban land. There were hundreds
of xitongs in Shenzhen, and a few important ones were referred to as the
“eight great lords” (bada zhuhou), indicating their capacity and autonomy
in the municipality. (20) The xitongs secured a high quantity and quality of
land through the provision of loans, leverage, and political support for the
municipal government. One retired official commented that the collabora-
tions between different segments of the state promoted growth when Shen-
zhen was weak and poor, and minimised risks once the municipality became
prosperous and autonomous. (21)
The primacy of xitong can be traced back to the administrative and spatial
arrangements in Shekou, the first open industrial zone created in China’s
market reforms. China Merchant Group, a subsidiary of the Ministry of Com-
munications, was assigned the responsibility of managing the “window” or
testing ground for foreign capital investment in 1979. The transportation
xitong has since controlled all of the land appropriation in Shekou, which
was approximately one thirtieth of the initial SEZ area. The group formed a
management committee in the industrial zone and concurrently expanded
its business there. This experiment not only blurred the line between the
state and market, but also reproduced certain socialist danwei practices
over the course of market reforms. Shekou’s founding head and Shenzhen’s
longest serving mayor concurred that this arrangement aimed to limit the
mobility of the workers, contain the effects of the development zone, and
safeguard the danwei workers’ livelihood during the early reform stages. (22)
Early comers who were worried about the uncertainty of investing in a
socialist regime found assurance in these danwei institutions. Two senior
executives of manufacturing companies recalled that in addition to the land
required to build the factories, their joint enterprises in Shekou were allo-
cated an extra portion of land to build factory dormitories in the early 1980s
and early 1990s. Apart from the advantage of controlling the factors of pro-
duction, these manufacturing companies were also attracted by the divi-
dends from the land assets. Although the law prohibits the mortgaging of a
factory dormitory, in practice these building structures have always in-
creased the total estimated value of the factory complex. This practice,
which is still in force as of 2014, has provided a strong economic incentive
for investors to support the socialist legacy. (23)
As a result of the collaboration between the xitongs and firms, many early
migrants in Shenzhen’s export-oriented industry were not required to find
their own urban shelters, as suitable ones were designated in advance. Man-
ufacturing companies have produced many multi-storey factories and high-
rise dormitories in the industrial zones or outskirts. For large enterprises, the
dormitories were built adjacent to the factories; for medium enterprises,
the factories and dormitories were packed onto different floors in the same
compounds. The most extreme example was Foxconn, a mega world plant
that accommodated all of its 550,000 workers in the dormitories on two
campuses in Bao’an District. (24)
Although the appearance of a factory dormitory was similar to standard
residential apartments, the facilities inside were primitive and the living
space was restricted. Our field studies suggest that the migrants slept on
bunk beds on which they also hung their clothes and belongings. Each room
accommodated eight to 24 people, and hence each individual living space
was as small as 20 square feet. The number of inhabitants on each floor
ranged from 50 to 120 people, and everyone shared a public bathroom. Re-
gardless of the workers’ marital status, they were treated as single and
packed into single-sex dormitories. (25) One exception was found on Fox-
conn’s Longhua campus, where all sorts of communal, recreational, and
catering facilities were installed. That particular campus was propagated as
a model factory for customers, governments, and media. Similar facilities
were absent from other Foxconn campuses or other companies. (26)
Several factors were required to reproduce a spatially regulated workplace
in the reform era. First, complimentary dormitories were allocated and
served as housing stipends to extract marginal labour productivity and con-
trol the factors of production, particularly in response to the fluctuation be-
tween peak and low seasons. (27) Training, surveillance, and overtime work
were more manageable when the migrant workers were accommodated
next to the factory. Second, once the migrant workers resided inside a fac-
tory complex in an industrial zone, their mobility and interaction with other
social actors were effectively restricted. The migrants’ service to industrial
development was consumed, and their potential threats to city order were
minimised.
These practices suggest that the Chinese state might have selectively
retreated from its functions during the market reforms. (28) They also in-
evitably gave rise to the concern that the spatial configurations in China’s
sunbelt were marginalising the migrants. The migrants were provided with
a place to stay and work in the city, but their “rights to the city” were
concurrently denied. This thesis proposes that ordinary citizens should
have been entitled to participate in important decisions that shaped their
city and affected their livelihoods, and that the boundary of public space
has since been extended and reproduced by progressive politics. (29) From
this perspective, the factory dormitories functioned almost as temporary
birdcages in which the rural migrants remained tenants and human re-
sources but not citizens.
Although the migrants’ contestations were contained, they were not
resolved. Over time, the migrants resorted to various means to sustain
their contestations and denote their existence. A small majority chose
suicide to voice their grievances, as on the Foxconn campuses. Many of
them practised everyday resistance tactics such as nonconformity, foot-
dragging, or seeking advice from third parties. Staff of grassroots NGOs
note that migrant workers gradually become aware of their labour rights
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and the available mediation channels. (30) Yet their dominant strategy is
to exit rather than to voice protest or demands. When a choice is given,
migrant workers usually choose to move from factory dormitories to
urban villages. Surveys compiled by local NGOs reveals that whereas re-
siding in urban villages may not be migrant workers’ first priority after
entering the municipality, it is a common second step. Freedom from sur-
veillance is one reason; integration with the urban fabric and lifestyles is
another. (31) This in part explains why urban villages have overtaken fac-
tory dormitories as the dominant form of migrant settlement in recent
years.
Privatised enclaves on collective land
The joint-stock companies in the urban villages are the second group of
socialist land masters. Despite the market reforms, China continued to stip-
ulate a dual land tenure system in which urban land belonged to the state
and rural land belonged to the village collectives. Each member of the rural
community was entitled to an equal and inalienable piece of land that was
tenured and free of charge. The Land Administrative Law (2004) allowed
rural land to be acquired for urban development on the condition that ap-
propriate compensation was made. If the requisitioned land belonged to
the “land for construction” or “land for farming” classifications, then the
authority only had to provide financial compensation. If the requisitioned
land belonged to the “land for dwelling” (zhaijidi) classification, the au-
thority had to not only compensate the native villagers, but also nationalise
the collective land and hence transfer the villagers’ hukou from rural to
urban.
Although land for construction and farming was frequently tapped for
urban development and renewal, land for dwelling was left untouched until
large-scale urban redevelopment projects began in the mid-2000s. This was
a result of the complicated and costly requisition mechanisms required for
this type of land, and of the risk of openly violating fundamental socialist
rights. (32) The entitlement to, transfer, and size of the land for dwelling are
regulated by local decrees. In Guangdong Province, the right to transfer land
for dwelling is restricted to the respective collective. (33) In the municipality
of Shenzhen, the size of the buildings on each piece of land for dwelling was
limited to 480 m2. Across China, the distribution of land for dwelling was
allocated in terms of households rather than individuals. However, an un-
married native villager under the age of 30 regardless of sex was recognised
as a household in Shenzhen. Native villagers were defined as those who reg-
istered before 1 January 1991 in the city centre and before 29 October 2004
in the outskirts, i.e., the dates on which the land in the respective areas was
nationalised. (34) Because the descendants of native villagers are no longer
entitled to the allocation of land for dwelling, the institutional foundation
for the formation of urban villages has been removed.
Most of the urban village housing was built on land for dwelling, the cat-
egory into which rural land fell within the administrative boundaries of each
city. This process was the result of rapid urbanisation and industrialisation,
whereby cities expanded and absorbed the farmlands and villages of peri-
urban areas into their jurisdictions. In 2000, Shenzhen had 241 urban villages
occupying 43.9 km2 and housed 2.15 million inhabitants. By 2005, the figure
rose to 320 urban villages, occupying 93.5 km2 and housing 5.02 million in-
habitants, of which 4.69 million were rural migrants. (35)
In 1992, all of the village committees were privatised into joint-stock com-
panies whose shares were allocated according to native households, and
males were overwhelmingly represented. (36) Although a typical urban village
in Shenzhen had around 70,000 people, its property rights were confined
to around 1,100 shareholders who were native households in Shenzhen’s
administrative villages. Its administrative power was concentrated in a small
group of village bosses. Three out of the four joint-stock company chairmen
and deputies we interviewed had held their positions since 1992, and two
had been village committee chairmen prior to 1992.
Comparing the characteristics of Shenzhen’s urban villages with the squat-
ter settlements in the developing world revealed many differences and only
a few similarities. The following sections introduce the similarities and then
explain the differences in terms of space, affluence, order, and prospects.
Prior to our examination of urban village characteristics, we briefly define
the features of a slum. UN-Habitat defines slums as indicators of urban
poverty and their proliferation as one of the most pressing global issues. (37)
Some refer to slums as a hotbed for organised crime, spatial exclusion, and
perpetual marginalisation. (38) Others note that a slum is an enclave where
the state has been perpetually replaced by other coercive forces or social
networks. (39) Simply put, a typical slum can be defined in terms of urban
poverty, social decay, and political anarchy. Once it emerges, a slum be-
comes a substandard, irregular, and durable enclave.
Urban villages are similar to squatter settlements in that they offer
cheap and affordable shelters to poor rural migrants. Because the land
for dwelling is free, the cost of a house is almost identical to the cost of
construction. The capital investment for such self-built housing is rela-
tively small and can be easily financed through the villagers’ personal
savings or borrowed from relatives, friends, and local credit unions. Urban
villages hence offer highly accessible accommodation at decreased prices,
making them extremely competitive in a fluxing city’s low-end rental
market. 
In 2005, the average rent in Shenzhen’s urban villages was only one- to
two-thirds that of formal settlements. According to real-estate agents and
landlords, the rent for urban village housing accounted for roughly one-
fifth to one-seventh of rural migrants’ monthly income. As of 2012, a two-
bedroom apartment in the outskirts, rented by migrant workers who either
refused to live or were not given a place in a factory dormitory, cost be-
tween 300 and 600 yuan a month. Similar sized apartments in urban vil-
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lages in the city proper, which were only affordable to migrant entrepre-
neurs or white-collar migrants, cost between 800 and 1,500 yuan. (40)
Apartments in urban villages are similar in terms of housing standards. They
are often crowded and violate fire and building regulations. Subordinated to
a rural land system and regulated by rural apparatuses, villagers enjoyed more
flexibility in adopting the city planning regulations. An estimated 56% of the
buildings in Shenzhen contained illegal structures, the majority of which were
concentrated in the urban villages. (41) Moreover, motivated by high demand
and lucrative gain, the villagers commonly built high-density housing that
maximised floor area. Houses in the city centre were kept at around five to
six storeys high, while those in the outskirts were pushed to 12 storeys after
2000. These exceeded the municipal building regulations that capped the
height of village houses at three storeys and 480 m2.
Poverty and substandard living environments have contributed to the
spread of illegal activity, which is another defining feature of slums and
shantytowns. Prostitution, gambling, and drugs (huangdudu) became promi-
nent in some urban villages, some of which were highlighted by Shenzhen’s
Public Security Bureau as black spots with frequent and high occurrences
of criminal activity. Some landlords and public officials in the urban villages
were accused of perpetrating and protecting those crimes. (42) However, none
have thrown the enclaves into anarchy by substituting joint-stock compa-
nies or excluding municipal intervention.
Wealth and order in urban villages
Although urban villages resemble shantytowns to the extent that they
are indicators of both poverty and deviant activity, they differ greatly in
terms of their spatial form and economy. First, although a structure may be
illegal, that does not mean the building materials are primitive and unsafe.
On the contrary, most of the apartments in Shenzhen’s urban villages were
built with durable materials by professional construction teams. Each house
normally contained a foundation, windows, glazed tiles and roofing, along
with shared kitchens and bathrooms. The apartments were often rented to
several migrants of the same kin or subleased by an agency working on be-
half of the landlords. Second, durable materials were used because the hous-
ing was not a one-off purchase commodity, but rather a financial asset that
could generate regular dividends. Precedents suggested that although unsafe
and hazardous buildings had been torn down, illegal or unauthorised struc-
tures qualified for compensation, albeit discounted. Relatively durable build-
ings would therefore maximise the villagers’ claims for appropriate
compensation during urban renewal. Third, because the affluent native vil-
lagers were legally restricted and communally bonded to stay in their apart-
ments, they had an incentive to maintain a higher building standard. (43)
Due to the low income-earning capacity of migrants and their back-and-
forth migration pattern, landlords had little incentive to decorate apart-
ments. Most apartments were thus rented out unfurnished and without any
electrical appliances. However, this does not indicate that every urban vil-
lage was a source of squalor or despair. In fact, the standard of living varied
greatly in different urban villages and among different migrant groups. In
most cases, the upper floors of the urban village houses were rented to mi-
grant workers to live in, and migrant entrepreneurs used the ground floors
to conduct business. Apart from individual practices and local brands, global
chains including Adidas, McDonald’s, and Wal-Mart had authorised retailers
or opened stores in the urban villages. Another indicator of the relative af-
fluence of urban villages was the common problem of a lack of parking
space, caused by the inhabitants’ ever-increasing car ownership and corre-
sponding with the wealth of migrant entrepreneurs and white-collar mi-
grants.
Furthermore, the urban village also distinguished itself in terms of public
amenities provision. Pathways, parks, parking spaces, street lighting, schools,
clinics, electricity/water supply, and public security were preserved or guar-
anteed. Water, electricity, and regulated parking spaces were private goods
made available to those who could afford them. Concrete pathways, parks,
street lighting, and public security were non-excludable and non-rival public
goods that could be consumed by every inhabitant, including native villagers
and rural migrants (Photo 1). Education and medical services were exclud-
able but non-rival club goods allocated to specific sectors of the commu-
nities. In general, scholarships were exclusive for native villagers, and clinical
services were available to everyone at differentiated rates. Most schools
were reserved for the children of native villagers, but the remainder were
open to everyone. The Teochew and Hakka clans, who have always been the
largest commercial tenants and service providers in the urban villages, have
enjoyed priority in the allocation and consumption of these club goods and
services (Photo 2). (44)
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Photo 1 – Recreational and cultural facilities. 
© Edmund W. Cheng
Photo 2 – Commercial street of the Teochow clan. 
© Edmund W. Cheng
Compared with settlements in the outskirts, the urban villages in the city
centre tended to enjoy a better quality and quantity of public goods and
services. Only the affluent urban villages could afford to provide recre-
ational, communal, and cultural facilities. In Futian Village, an open-air cul-
tural plaza the size of a football field was erected, and an underground car
park large enough to hold hundreds of cars was constructed beneath it. In
Caiwuwei Village, a total of 10 million yuan has been invested in education
since 1992. The scholarship awards given to the descendants of native vil-
lagers to study at prestigious Chinese or overseas universities in 2012 to-
talled 625,000 yuan. In addition, according to the senior executives of the
joint-stock companies, almost every village in the city centre has renovated
or reinstalled their ancestor halls over the last decade. (45)
Nonetheless, a series of rationalisation projects have started to interfere
with certain domains of the joint-stock companies in the areas of standard-
isation, cleanliness, and orderliness. Public goods related to health, education,
and traffic have gradually been municipalised. Many native villagers and rural
migrants complained about the city authority banning their clinics and pri-
mary schools and standardising their parking spaces and traffic signs in the
urban villages. However, the municipal authority has not superseded the
functions and authority of the joint-stock companies. These companies re-
sponded by negotiating the intervention boundaries with the state. Pharma-
cies and kindergartens remained intact, and schools and hospitals were built
adjacent to the urban villages. Furthermore, these companies succeeded at
maintaining control over the coercive force and becoming the service
providers of rationalisation projects in the urban villages (Photo 3). (46)
The joint-stock companies have always shared the same office with
their coercive force, resembling the classic “two units, same personnel”
(yitao banzi, liangkuai paizi 一套班子两块牌子) structure. The coercive
force was further divided into security guards (bao’an) and a collective
security team (lianfang dadui). The former was responsible for managing
ordinary public security such as organising daily patrols, issuing parking
tickets, and collecting fines. The latter was deployed in times of emer-
gency to combat organised crime and monitor large-scale demolitions.
The funding of these two coercive groups came mainly from the man-
agement fees paid by tenants. The cost varied, ranging from 0.3 yuan per
m2 per month in the outskirts to 1 yuan in the city proper. The standard
size of the coercive force also varied, ranging from tens of people to sev-
eral hundred. However, the regular personnel routinely underestimated
the size and function of the coercive force. Over time, temporary per-
sonnel were employed to monitor large-scale demolitions and manage
overt contestation in the urban villages or other villages. Revenue from
land sales and the rent of collectives was periodically drawn to finance
this spontaneous yet persistent expense.
A deputy chairman of a joint-stock company in the Luohu District ex-
plained the incentives for regulating order and differentiating the treatment
of native villagers and rural migrants as follows:
Nowadays the risky and nasty jobs will have to be handled by the
temporarily employed security guards. Only migrants are capable of
handling migrants, and only in this way could we fulfil the require-
ment of a harmonious society. Troublemakers must be taught a les-
son. We cannot always count on external personnel (wairen) to
protect this place. The villagers would not respect your authority if
their requests for help were not properly addressed. How can we have
the face to be greeted as chief and share a table with them in the
ancestral hall? Chaos is not good for the renting business either. (47)
The authority and jurisdiction of the intermediate agencies have been
recognised by external authorities. First, neighbourhood committees and
district governments have continued to share budgets to manage the urban
villages. Although the ratio has varied, the amounts were as large as 20 mil-
lion yuan per year for the urban villages in the city centre after 2008. A
budget was allocated to upgrade transportation and recreational facilities
and improve the city’s appearance. For example, in 2011, Luohu District
spent 6.36 million yuan to conduct a water environment improvement proj-
ect across several urban villages, most of which were billed to and managed
by the joint-stock companies. (48) Any rationalisation projects in the urban
villages were thus channelled through the joint-stock companies. 
Second, the coercive force of the state has observed the jurisdictions of
the joint-stock companies. Prior to the 2011 Summer Universiade Games,
the police and urban management enforcement (chengguan) guarded or
blocked the entrances of tens of urban villages to control the massive
amount of illegal construction and improve the city’s appearance. This policy
ultimately had little effect, as the landlords bypassed the checkpoints and
smuggled the building materials in at midnight or dawn. A compromise was
N o . 2 0 1 4 / 2  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 33
45. Interviews, Shenzhen, 24 and 25 September 2013. See also Shenzhen Commercial Daily, 22 April
2012, A11;
46. SUVRO, Shenzhen Urban Village Redevelopment Annual Report 2006, op. cit.; interviews, Shen-
zhen, 13 August 2012.
47. Interview, Shenzhen, 24 September 2013.
48. Interviews, Shenzhen, 24 and 25 September 2013; Shenzhen Municipality Luohu District Audit
Report, 2013, No. 134, www.szlh.gov.cn/main/a/2013/i17/a244348_880658.shtml (accessed on
1 March 2014).
Edmund W. Cheng – Managing Migrant Contestation
Photo 3 – Public security vehicles owned by the joint-stock
companies. 
© Edmund W. Cheng
Photo 4 – Standardised building appearance. 
© Edmund W. Cheng
reached when the respective companies promised to cap the further ex-
pansion of illegal structures at one or two storeys. The municipal appara-
tuses then fulfilled their improvement agenda by standardising the colours
and rooftops of the buildings adjacent to the main avenues (Photo 4). (49)
The autonomy of the company was preserved despite carrying out the most
comprehensive rationalisation project to date.
Because of the collective land ownership, the wellbeing of the landlords
and tenants was tied to the general interests of the urban villages. A safe
and governed enclave stabilised the rental value and monopolised the serv-
ices in the villages, and also kept the interventions from city apparatuses in
check. In this way, the role of joint-stock companies has not changed much
compared with the pre-reform period. Indeed, these companies have con-
tinued to serve as producers and protectors.
Exclusive stakeholders and fragile enclaves 
In contrast to the extensive and durable slum enclaves in the developing
world, the development of China’s urban villages has been sporadic and
fragile. The differential treatment of farming, construction, and dwelling land
has structurally determined the parameters of urban villages. Because the
former two were requisitioned for urban development and the latter was
retained for the construction of substandard accommodations, the rural
land swallowed by urban sprawl has been cut into pieces. Although crowded
in terms of density, urban villages built on land for dwelling were limited in
space. Each of the original villages is randomly located, minute in scale, and
often intersected by high-rises erected on former rural land.
These historical urban villages wind up looking rather fragile in light of the
different stages of urban redevelopment. The Shenzhen government has in-
creasingly treated urban planning as identical to the realisation of the ex-
change value of land in the market. (50) Urban villages have thus become the
main targets of elimination because they have been considered not only
the roots of urban decay, but also a waste of land use value. In the midst of
modern zoning, urban villages have been considered economically ineffec-
tive, aesthetically undesirable, and spatially incongruous.
As early as 1995, the Shenzhen government launched a land appropriation
scheme to allocate new incentives for joint-stock companies to sell their
remaining land for farming and construction and to reserve the land for
dwelling. The joint-stock companies were offered a more favourable package
once they agreed to sell a vast piece of land, supplemented by redevelop-
ment rights and shares. The Central Business District of Luohu District, which
included a number of the tallest buildings and largest shopping malls in
South China, was acquired through this scheme. Joint-stock companies were
turned into large landlords that owned and managed large commercial
buildings and shopping malls in the area. Likewise, this scheme enabled the
creation of the Civic Centre in Futian District, which served as the head-
quarters of the municipal government and its major servicing bureaus.
In 2005, a master plan for urban village redevelopment was published. This
plan aimed to demolish as much as 8.9 km2 or around 10% of the urban
villages in the municipality over five years. The prime project sought to re-
develop Dachong Village in Nanshan District, which involved an area of
684,000 m2, the relocation of more than 70,000 households and a budget
of 20 billion yuan. (51) It adopted a state-corporative partnership in which
the government consummated the acquisition and demolition and then
auctioned the land off to giant developers, many of which belonged to dif-
ferent xitongs. In contrast, the redevelopment of Xiasha Village in Futian
District adopted a market-led model, in which the developers allocated
shares to the joint-stock companies in exchange for the latter’s land use
rights and cooperation. The urban villages in the outskirts have been left
behind thus far, mainly due to their relatively low exchange values. (52)
Whatever the model, it has required cooperation between the two groups
of socialist land masters. Many xitongs have emerged as the largest devel-
opers in light of Shenzhen’s economic boom. They have become socially
networked and financially prepared for the huge redevelopment projects.
They were frequently chosen as the developers under the government-led
model and often approached by landlords in the market-led model. (53) One
example is the Overseas China Town Group, a subsidiary under China’s
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. In the
inner city, this group built and managed the biggest electronic goods whole-
sale centre and the biggest theme park in South China. In the outskirts, it
developed gated communities and villas for the urban middle class, all of
which required a large parcel of land and hence the consent of the urban
villages.
As the largest landowners of abundant or underdeveloped land, the joint-
stock companies have been pro-active and cooperative. When the compa-
nies were also the developers, they would make the offers directly. If not,
they then coordinated sales and negotiated prices on behalf of the landlords.
Although the law sets a minimum of 80% of the ownership in the redevel-
opment zone as a prerequisite for initiating a project, it did not deter or hin-
der the demolition of urban villages. (54) The standard number of shareholders
in a joint-stock company in Shenzhen has been kept at around 1,100. These
shareholders have been prohibited from transferring their entitled shares of
rural land, whose ownership belongs to the collective. Although a small
number transferred their rights to other native villagers, the perimeter of
the stakeholders ready for acquisition was limited.
Handsome compensation was another reason that accounted for the col-
lective approval of urban redevelopment. Sometimes negotiations turned
lengthy because of the booming real estate market, rather than because of
organised resistance or violent conflict. For example, in redeveloping the
aforementioned prime project, Dachong Village, the compensation price was
set at 9, 000 yuan per m2 in September 2006 and then rose to 12, 000 yuan
per m2 a year later. Eventually, one of the six-storey urban village buildings
was sold for 12 million yuan in 2007, an average price roughly equal to
15,000 yuan per m2. This pattern has continued, thereby producing hundreds
of millionaires overnight in the urban villages. (55)
Some landlords did resist redevelopment projects and turned their
dwellings into “nail households” (dingzihu 钉子户), a term referring to the
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few residents who stayed at their properties and refused to be relocated.
Although there was a mixture of personal, economic, and communal factors
affecting their decision to resist, one political factor seems decisive. Records
show that many dingzihu in Shenzhen’s urban villages were either Hong
Kong residents or foreign nationals. This unique status entitled them to the
right to request assistance from state apparatuses such as the Overseas
Chinese Affairs Office or the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office in the mu-
nicipality, and gave them the leverage to approach the more critical local
and foreign media. (56) Although these dingzihu have routinely been depicted
as victims of the coercive state or an inhumane planning regime, one must
recognise that they were far from the most disadvantaged group. Their
grievances were still propagated, and their negotiations supported by the
authorities. Like the more obedient landlords, these dingzihu were also prop-
erty owners who had access to various state apparatuses.
In contrast, the living space of rural migrants has been continuously re-
shaped, and their place in the most expensive area of the city centre was
marginalised. Being neither property owners nor citizens deprived rural mi-
grants of the right to receive compensation. In light of the redevelopment
projects, most retreated to the urban villages in the outskirts, which con-
tinued to offer affordable accommodations for the time being. Others who
had collective land ownership in the countryside floated back, contributing
to the back-and-forth labour shortage in the coastal China area that has
occurred since 2009. (57) These two exit points have absorbed any organised
resistance on behalf of the rural migrants, and as such have defined the
fragility of the migrant enclaves in China’s sunbelt.
Despite institutional absorption, rural migrants have continued to generate
contestation through their residency and work in the city. In fact, urban liv-
ing has increasingly become the vision and choice for the majority of sec-
ond-generation rural migrants. This has resulted in part from their adherence
to urban lifestyles and capitalist consumption, and in part from the fact
that their collective land in the countryside has either been taken over by
their parents or already expropriated by rural development and urban
sprawl. The combined effect is that rural migrants are mentally prepared
and economically tied to the urban system. As a forerunner in China’s urban
contestation, Shenzhen recognised that both the prospect of export-ori-
ented growth and the transformation into a consumption-driven economy
would draw heavily on manpower, skills, and savings of the rural migrants.
To this end, a point-based system was introduced in 2010 to allow talented,
educated, and long-serving rural migrants to obtain urban hukou. The sys-
tem along with other experiments further revoked the hukou prerequisite
for many public services, including subsidised housing and school places. In
addition, many grassroots NGOs in Shenzhen have already made migrant
assimilation their top priority. (58) In other words, the future of China’s
megacities will depend on how rural migrants are incorporated into their
social and urban fabrics rather than on how effectively the urban villages
are torn down. 
Conclusion 
The spatial contestation in China’s sunbelt city has largely been managed
and regulated by the interplay between socialist institutions and neoliberal
forces in the context of the rural-urban divide. Factory dormitories and
urban villages, which have become the dominant forms of migrant accom-
modations in Shenzhen, are the physical evidence of their collaboration. The
land appropriation mechanism has provided affordable and convenient ac-
commodations to the most disadvantaged in a highly contested urban
space. This enabled China to consume a cheap and reliable labour force for
economic development and to check the social decay and ungoverned
space that are common to third-world urbanisation.
These spatial arrangements have also revealed the mechanism by which
power and wealth are distributed in China’s heterogeneous migrant en-
claves. Most rural migrants, despite residing in the city for years, have re-
mained tenants who have neither owned a home nor constructed a
community. Compared with the intermediate agencies, their rights and ca-
pacity have been marginalised over the course of urban sprawl and renewal.
In this light, distance from the state apparatuses has continued to have a
deterministic effect on one’s well-being: the xitongs, joint-stock companies,
and native villagers on one hand, and rural migrants on the other occupy
opposing ends of a spectrum.
To be sure, the absence of overt resistance should not be mistaken for a
lack of contestation. The rural migrants’ continuous presence, including their
residence, work, and exchange in Shenzhen, has transformed the socio-eco-
nomic fabric of the city. However, its spatial and political order has largely
been preserved by the intermediate agencies between collective land sys-
tem and market force or between the state apparatuses and grassroots so-
ciety. They provided affordable dwellings, distributed public goods, and
mediated exit points, thereby regulating the migrant contestations and in-
tegrating the migrant enclaves into the formal city.
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